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	<title>Prometheus</title>
	<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com</link>
	<description>Johns Hopkins Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2011 04:21:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>The Liturgical and the Ethical in Lacoste and Kierkegaard</title>
		<description><![CDATA[
By: ALEXANDER GILMAN

The relationship between the liturgical, defined by Jean-Yves Lacoste as “the logic that presides over the encounter between man and God writ large,” and the ethical is deeply ambiguous. Throughout Lacoste’s phenomenological work, Experience and the Absolute, the call of man and the world is set in contrast with the call of the Absolute. In this text Lacoste begins with the Heideggerian notion of our being as being-in-the world-toward-death and explores how a liturgical relationship with the absolute subverts, but also sublates, our being-in-the-world in favor of a ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2011/09/the-liturgical-and-the-ethical-in-lacoste-and-kierkegaard/</link>
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		<title>Justified False Beliefs and Truth as a Redundant Condition</title>
		<description><![CDATA[By: STEVE TENSMEYER
Despite the common intuition that something is very wrong with the Gettier problems, after forty years they still seem to be intractable.  The responses to these paradoxes of knowledge range from complaints against their logical structure to conclusions that knowledge simply cannot be analyzed.  Most philosophers, however, take a position somewhere in between these two extremes; their responses advocate changing the traditional Justified True Belief model of knowledge to something that “de-Gettierizes” knowledge.  This almost always means either adding some fourth condition or clarifying or ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2011/09/justified-false-beliefs-and-truth-as-a-redundant-condition/</link>
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		<title>Reason and Self-Interest in Hobbes&#8217; Reply to the Fool</title>
		<description><![CDATA[By JOSEPH CARLSMITH
ABSTRACT: The Fool offers a famous objection to Hobbesian ethics: if practical rationality is rooted in self-interest, then isn’t it rational to abandon ethical reasoning when doing so “conduces to one’s benefit”? In this paper, I examine Hobbes’ reply to the Fool as it reveals the limitations of the moral theory presented in Leviathan. I begin by sketching out the reply and two traditional ways of interpreting it – the “case-by-case” interpretation and the “rule-commitment” interpretation. I argue that for empirical reasons both these interpretations fail to answer ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2011/09/reason-and-self-interest-in-hobbes-reply-to-the-fool/</link>
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		<title>Therapy, Ethics, and Religiosity: The Necessity of Conversion Included in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Therapy</title>
		<description><![CDATA[By MICHAEL PUTNAM
In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, he writes that the ideal philosopher “treats a question; like an illness” (PI 255). This move from treating a question as something to be answered to treating it as something to be cured might encapsulate the focus of the Investigations; it certainly sums up Wittgenstein’s approach to various problems relating to the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, and the philosophy of mind. In this sense, Wittgenstein considers his method therapeutic and concludes that philosophy should do nothing more than demonstrate how ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2011/09/therapy-ethics-and-religiosity-the-necessity-of-conversion-included-in-wittgenstein%e2%80%99s-philosophical-therapy/</link>
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		<title>Hellfire: A Loving God, Infinite Suffering, and the Reliability of the Bible</title>
		<description><![CDATA[By ERIN McDONNELL
ABSTRACT: One of the most imposing problems facing the modern theist philosopher is the ‘problem of Hell,’ or the problem of how to make the Bible’s depiction of Hell as a place of eternal punishment logically consistent with the generally held theist idea that God is perfectly loving.  This issue has been dealt with by a number of philosophers; some have attempted to re-imagine Hell into something less severe than eternal punishment, and some have attempted to give justifications for the traditional version of Hell.  An ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2011/09/hellfire-a-loving-god-infinite-suffering-and-the-reliability-of-the-bible/</link>
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		<title>The Will to Act and the Paradigm Shift Away From Aristotle’s Physics</title>
		<description><![CDATA[By JUAN M. BOTERO-DUQUE
ABSTRACT: The present study seeks to put together a critical assessment of the role that that “Will,” actualized through techné, played in Aristotle’s physics. It will be shown how said concept of Will led to a theoretical fissure of the Aristotelian cosmos between the natural and the artificial, which was finally detrimental to the sustainability of his scientific proposals. Furthermore, light will be shed on the incompatibility between Aristotelian physics and mathematics, an area of knowledge that was to become the primordial tool of modern scientific inquiry. ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2010/12/the-will-to-act-and-the-paradigm-shift-away-from-aristotle%e2%80%99s-physics/</link>
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		<title>Brain Steroids: Ethical Concerns Regarding Cosmetic Neurology and Psychopharmacology</title>
		<description><![CDATA[By GENNADIY KATSEVMAN
ABSTRACT: Advancements in the field of medicine have created several novel ethical concerns. Developments in neuroscience, for example, have resulted in the creation of a new field called “neuroethics.” This paper addresses the neuroethical issue of psychopharmacological enhancement; should society have rules against psychopharmacological enhancement or “brain steroids,” particularly in academia? If so, on what guidelines should the rules be based? I argue that there should be no major restrictions against enhancement itself, although drugs that are blatantly harmful should be prohibited as with therapeutic drugs. In Part One, I provide arguments in favor of psychopharmacological enhancement. In Part Two, I describe and refute ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2010/12/brain-steroids-ethical-concerns-regarding-cosmetic-neurology-and-psychopharmacology/</link>
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		<title>Dennett&#8217;s Propositional Attitudes</title>
		<description><![CDATA[By KAROLINA WISNIEWSKI
ABSTRACT: The following paper will seek to do two things: succinctly outline Dennett’s defense of propositional attitudes as having causal powers over human behaviour using the intentional stance, and subsequently analyze the specific downfalls in his position which render his argument ineffective. Dennett’s wish to validate propositional attitudes stems from the desire to retain a certain degree of scientific certainty without doing away with the language of beliefs, values and intentions. His answer to the body-mind problem is to explain the how abstract sounding phenomena such as intentions are able to affect the physical ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2010/12/dennetts-propositional-attitudes/</link>
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		<title>Rorty, Connolly, and the Role of Irony</title>
		<description><![CDATA[By MATT FRIBERG
ABSTRACT: Despite agreeing on the importance of irony, Richard Rorty and William Connolly differ sharply on its role for the individual, and for society more broadly. That is, Rorty understands irony as of strictly personal use, whereas Connolly bases an entire public realm on ironic discourse. I will, in this paper, analyze each thinker’s views on irony’s ultimate function. That is, I will articulate Rorty’s view of ironist theory as problematic, and will attempt to apply Rorty’s claims regarding the ironist theorist to Connolly’s project. Also, I will ...]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2010/12/rorty-connolly-and-the-role-of-irony/</link>
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		<title>On Particle-Waves, a Mediating Gaze and the Narrative Sequence</title>
		<description><![CDATA[<b>By NATALIE RODRIGUEZ</b><br />This paper works through Gilberto Perez’s theory of film narrative, clarifying his distinction between drama and narrative as relevant to understanding the singular form of cinematic narration employed in Renoir’s <i>The Rules of the Game (1939)</i>. Rather than thinking of film as being of one primary form or another, one should recognize that such terms are primarily of functional value and should not be taken as actual properties of film, and that broadening our terms to include drama and narrative gives us more insight in talking about film and frees us from the ontological commitment of having to posit invisible, effaced narrators in film where there is no evidence.</br>]]></description>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2010/12/on-particle-waves-a-mediating-gaze-and-the-narrative-sequence/</link>
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