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	<title>Comments for Prometheus</title>
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	<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com</link>
	<description>Johns Hopkins Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 07 Mar 2010 18:26:37 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Comment on Heidegger’s Secular Fall by Sean Pudmoe</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/12/heidegger%e2%80%99s-secular-fall/comment-page-1/#comment-396</link>
		<dc:creator>Sean Pudmoe</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 07 Mar 2010 18:26:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=1125#comment-396</guid>
		<description>Excellent paper. I think you really captured the essence of the text and explained it in a modernly relevant fashion.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Excellent paper. I think you really captured the essence of the text and explained it in a modernly relevant fashion.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Heidegger’s Secular Fall by Jacob Levin</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/12/heidegger%e2%80%99s-secular-fall/comment-page-1/#comment-394</link>
		<dc:creator>Jacob Levin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 22 Feb 2010 17:02:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=1125#comment-394</guid>
		<description>Very well argued.  The self-contradictory nature of BT on the issue of community is something that has been picked up by a number of post-liberal and communitarian interpreters of Heidegger.  They often look back to Heidegger&#039;s earlier writings as a place in which Heidegger leaves more room for the possibility of authentic community.  In his Lectures on the Phenomenology of Religion (especially the part on the having-become of the Thessalonians), Heidegger seems to suggest that early Christians achieved some level of authenticity without escaping the being-with of their local community (though one should not overlook that this community was offering an alternate identity to the one offered by society at large).  While this possibility remains vaguely present in BT (see the positive mode of solicitude in BT 159/122), Heidegger seems to have been somewhat seduced by the liberal valorization of the autonomous individual and forgotten his earlier insight into the inability to escape our own presuppositions (see James K. A. Smith&#039;s essay &quot;Against Christian Atheism&quot;).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Very well argued.  The self-contradictory nature of BT on the issue of community is something that has been picked up by a number of post-liberal and communitarian interpreters of Heidegger.  They often look back to Heidegger&#8217;s earlier writings as a place in which Heidegger leaves more room for the possibility of authentic community.  In his Lectures on the Phenomenology of Religion (especially the part on the having-become of the Thessalonians), Heidegger seems to suggest that early Christians achieved some level of authenticity without escaping the being-with of their local community (though one should not overlook that this community was offering an alternate identity to the one offered by society at large).  While this possibility remains vaguely present in BT (see the positive mode of solicitude in BT 159/122), Heidegger seems to have been somewhat seduced by the liberal valorization of the autonomous individual and forgotten his earlier insight into the inability to escape our own presuppositions (see James K. A. Smith&#8217;s essay &#8220;Against Christian Atheism&#8221;).</p>
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		<title>Comment on The Case For Vague Objects by William Melendez</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/12/de-re-modality-and-lewis%ca%bc-modal-realism-the-case-for-vague-objects/comment-page-1/#comment-392</link>
		<dc:creator>William Melendez</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 20 Feb 2010 01:36:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=1133#comment-392</guid>
		<description>After reading this paper several times, I have to confess that I am unable to understand the argument that is supposed to support the thesis that, despite Lewis&#039; statements to the contrary, Lewisian modal realism entails &#039;metaphysical vagueness&#039;. I am not sure that I even understand exactly what the author means by &#039;metaphysical vagueness&#039;; its definition is not so obvious. 
However, I do recognize that a valid intuition about counterpart theory is made in the paper,  which I believe to be that the answer to the question &#039;when are Davis Lewis&#039; counterparts exhausted?&#039; would be arbitrary, and so, contra Lewis, counterpart theory is not &quot;precise&quot; enough to allow us to do any real &quot;de re&quot; metaphysic work. Moreover, I get the point that Kripke does not have this problem because all Kripkes across all possible worlds are identical and necessarily so. Kripkean identity is a strict and necessary relation. 
What I found to be the more interesting critique of Lewis was the short remarks against Lewis&#039; ontological commitment that there is a finite answer to the question of how many objects are in the world. I think the criticism that Lewis&#039; commitment could lead to question begging is insightful. If Lewis had claimed that there being a finite answer was a brute metaphysical fact, then everyone would have to simply agree or disagree, but he didn&#039;t cover himself that way. Case in point, when Quine asks the question &#039;what exists&#039; and answers it with &#039;Everything!&#039; it seems intuitive to ask if Quine has said anything substantive or is he close to question begging- what exists is what exists. 
I would have liked to have read more analysis on this assumption of Lewis&#039; instead of having it mentioned just as another argument thrown in like cannon fodder against Lewis, since I think it could have payed off with dividends. The point was well taken.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After reading this paper several times, I have to confess that I am unable to understand the argument that is supposed to support the thesis that, despite Lewis&#8217; statements to the contrary, Lewisian modal realism entails &#8216;metaphysical vagueness&#8217;. I am not sure that I even understand exactly what the author means by &#8216;metaphysical vagueness&#8217;; its definition is not so obvious.<br />
However, I do recognize that a valid intuition about counterpart theory is made in the paper,  which I believe to be that the answer to the question &#8216;when are Davis Lewis&#8217; counterparts exhausted?&#8217; would be arbitrary, and so, contra Lewis, counterpart theory is not &#8220;precise&#8221; enough to allow us to do any real &#8220;de re&#8221; metaphysic work. Moreover, I get the point that Kripke does not have this problem because all Kripkes across all possible worlds are identical and necessarily so. Kripkean identity is a strict and necessary relation.<br />
What I found to be the more interesting critique of Lewis was the short remarks against Lewis&#8217; ontological commitment that there is a finite answer to the question of how many objects are in the world. I think the criticism that Lewis&#8217; commitment could lead to question begging is insightful. If Lewis had claimed that there being a finite answer was a brute metaphysical fact, then everyone would have to simply agree or disagree, but he didn&#8217;t cover himself that way. Case in point, when Quine asks the question &#8216;what exists&#8217; and answers it with &#8216;Everything!&#8217; it seems intuitive to ask if Quine has said anything substantive or is he close to question begging- what exists is what exists.<br />
I would have liked to have read more analysis on this assumption of Lewis&#8217; instead of having it mentioned just as another argument thrown in like cannon fodder against Lewis, since I think it could have payed off with dividends. The point was well taken.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever by Sushant Garg</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/02/the-hardest-logic-puzzle-ever/comment-page-1/#comment-343</link>
		<dc:creator>Sushant Garg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2009 02:42:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=820#comment-343</guid>
		<description>there r 6 cases possible. my covention (true god-&gt;1, false god-&gt;0, random god-&gt;-1. 
so six cases are
A        B        C
1        0        -1           possibility-&gt;1
1        -1        0              &quot;       -&gt;2
0        1         -1             &quot;       -&gt;3
0        -1        1              &quot;       -&gt;4
-1       0          1             &quot;       -&gt;5
-1       1          0.            &quot;       -&gt;6
now every question will divide my possibilities in to two sets one giving da as answer and others ja as answer. so for final question i should have atmost two possibilities each giving differnt answer which would let me know which will be true after knowing the answer.which implies for second question i have atmost four possiblities. 
les say i ask the first question to A. then 5th and 6th possiblities can give both the answers.  my qustion will be &quot;what will be da of ja of da of the statement &#039;is the possibilty 1 or 4 right&#039;&quot;.
answers
possibilty-&gt;1------ja
possibilty-&gt;2------da
possibility-&gt;3-----ja
possibility-&gt;4-----da
possibility-&gt;5-----ja or da
possibility-&gt;6-----ja or da
if answer is ja
then i have 1 3 5 and 6 as possible cases or 2 4 5 and 6
taking 1 3 5 6
let me ask B &quot;what will be da of ja of da of the statement &#039;is the possibilty 1 or 6 right&#039;&quot;
1-&gt;   da
3-&gt;   da
5-&gt;   ja
6-&gt;   ja
so now i have either 1, 3 or 5 ,6 depending on the answer.now my third qustion will be again to b and it will be &quot;what is ja of da of da?&quot;
1-&gt;da
3-&gt;ja so according to answer i get i can decide whetder its 1 or 3.
as 1 3 5 6 is symmetrical to 2 4 5 6 so i am not discussing other cases. simmilarly i am not discussing 5 6 as it is symmetrical to 1 3 . please post ur queries.

coolgenius</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>there r 6 cases possible. my covention (true god-&gt;1, false god-&gt;0, random god-&gt;-1.<br />
so six cases are<br />
A        B        C<br />
1        0        -1           possibility-&gt;1<br />
1        -1        0              &#8221;       -&gt;2<br />
0        1         -1             &#8221;       -&gt;3<br />
0        -1        1              &#8221;       -&gt;4<br />
-1       0          1             &#8221;       -&gt;5<br />
-1       1          0.            &#8221;       -&gt;6<br />
now every question will divide my possibilities in to two sets one giving da as answer and others ja as answer. so for final question i should have atmost two possibilities each giving differnt answer which would let me know which will be true after knowing the answer.which implies for second question i have atmost four possiblities.<br />
les say i ask the first question to A. then 5th and 6th possiblities can give both the answers.  my qustion will be &#8220;what will be da of ja of da of the statement &#8216;is the possibilty 1 or 4 right&#8217;&#8221;.<br />
answers<br />
possibilty-&gt;1&#8212;&#8212;ja<br />
possibilty-&gt;2&#8212;&#8212;da<br />
possibility-&gt;3&#8212;&#8211;ja<br />
possibility-&gt;4&#8212;&#8211;da<br />
possibility-&gt;5&#8212;&#8211;ja or da<br />
possibility-&gt;6&#8212;&#8211;ja or da<br />
if answer is ja<br />
then i have 1 3 5 and 6 as possible cases or 2 4 5 and 6<br />
taking 1 3 5 6<br />
let me ask B &#8220;what will be da of ja of da of the statement &#8216;is the possibilty 1 or 6 right&#8217;&#8221;<br />
1-&gt;   da<br />
3-&gt;   da<br />
5-&gt;   ja<br />
6-&gt;   ja<br />
so now i have either 1, 3 or 5 ,6 depending on the answer.now my third qustion will be again to b and it will be &#8220;what is ja of da of da?&#8221;<br />
1-&gt;da<br />
3-&gt;ja so according to answer i get i can decide whetder its 1 or 3.<br />
as 1 3 5 6 is symmetrical to 2 4 5 6 so i am not discussing other cases. simmilarly i am not discussing 5 6 as it is symmetrical to 1 3 . please post ur queries.</p>
<p>coolgenius</p>
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		<title>Comment on Ethical Transvaluation and Consequentialism by Episode 9: Utilitarian Ethics: What Should We Do? &#124; The Partially Examined Life &#124; A Philosophy Podcast</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/09/ethical-transvaluation-and-consequentialism/comment-page-1/#comment-311</link>
		<dc:creator>Episode 9: Utilitarian Ethics: What Should We Do? &#124; The Partially Examined Life &#124; A Philosophy Podcast</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2009 05:41:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=1033#comment-311</guid>
		<description>[...] Prometheus » Ethical Transvaluation and Consequentialism [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Prometheus » Ethical Transvaluation and Consequentialism [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on What is philosophy? Why is it important? by Phil Abraham</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2008/10/what-is-philosophy-why-is-it-important/comment-page-1/#comment-309</link>
		<dc:creator>Phil Abraham</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2009 16:22:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/pub/?p=149#comment-309</guid>
		<description>&quot;The boundaries of philosophy are the boundaries of the world.&quot; 

This statement, in my opinion, is where the paper &quot;jumps the shark&quot; in what would otherwise be a very thoughtful paper. If the boundaries of philosophy are equivalent to the boundaries of the world, then perhaps you may be suggesting that the extent to which philosophy is the quest for knowledge, is indeed &#039;limited&#039; just as it the boundaries of this planet or world are &#039;limited&#039;. If that inference is true, then the theological queries of Aquinas or even existential introspections of Sartre would consequently be , according to your statement, contradictory. They are contradictory because the aforementioned philosophical speculations surely delve into greater depths of our thoughts - and , might I be so bold as to say, beyond the &#039;boundaries&#039; of our imagination. 

It is in fact, the inexistence of such boundaries, which intrigue the most insightful minds. As a result, it exposes to us &#039;mere mortals&#039; to the endless nuances and intricacies of philosophy. 

Keep on questioning.

in the spirit of academia, 
Philip</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8220;The boundaries of philosophy are the boundaries of the world.&#8221; </p>
<p>This statement, in my opinion, is where the paper &#8220;jumps the shark&#8221; in what would otherwise be a very thoughtful paper. If the boundaries of philosophy are equivalent to the boundaries of the world, then perhaps you may be suggesting that the extent to which philosophy is the quest for knowledge, is indeed &#8216;limited&#8217; just as it the boundaries of this planet or world are &#8216;limited&#8217;. If that inference is true, then the theological queries of Aquinas or even existential introspections of Sartre would consequently be , according to your statement, contradictory. They are contradictory because the aforementioned philosophical speculations surely delve into greater depths of our thoughts &#8211; and , might I be so bold as to say, beyond the &#8216;boundaries&#8217; of our imagination. </p>
<p>It is in fact, the inexistence of such boundaries, which intrigue the most insightful minds. As a result, it exposes to us &#8216;mere mortals&#8217; to the endless nuances and intricacies of philosophy. </p>
<p>Keep on questioning.</p>
<p>in the spirit of academia,<br />
Philip</p>
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		<title>Comment on Solution to the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever by Prometheus &#187; The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/09/solution-to-the-hardest-logic-puzzle-ever/comment-page-1/#comment-307</link>
		<dc:creator>Prometheus &#187; The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2009 03:18:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=1064#comment-307</guid>
		<description>[...] UPDATE: You can find my solution and other solutions to the puzzle here. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] UPDATE: You can find my solution and other solutions to the puzzle here. [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Threatening Ambivalence: Aliza Shvarts&#8217;s Disruption of the Patriarchal (Hetero)Normative by University Diaries &#187; Aliza Shvarts induces&#8230;</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/05/threatening-ambivalence-aliza-shvarts-and-the-disruption-of-the-patriarchal-heteronormative-asam-ahmad-aesthetics-ethics-14/comment-page-1/#comment-301</link>
		<dc:creator>University Diaries &#187; Aliza Shvarts induces&#8230;</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 08 Aug 2009 10:48:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=648#comment-301</guid>
		<description>[...] another abortion.  Margaret Soltan, 5:48AM Posted in: the piece that passeth all [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] another abortion.  Margaret Soltan, 5:48AM Posted in: the piece that passeth all [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever by Anthony</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/02/the-hardest-logic-puzzle-ever/comment-page-1/#comment-300</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2009 00:55:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=820#comment-300</guid>
		<description>also i used the &quot;hard rules&quot;....where you only ask each god one question</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>also i used the &#8220;hard rules&#8221;&#8230;.where you only ask each god one question</p>
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		<title>Comment on The Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever by Anthony</title>
		<link>http://www.prometheus-journal.com/2009/02/the-hardest-logic-puzzle-ever/comment-page-1/#comment-299</link>
		<dc:creator>Anthony</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Aug 2009 00:53:36 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.prometheus-journal.com/?p=820#comment-299</guid>
		<description>this took me  6 hrs to figure out ( i missed a day of studying for the mcat)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>this took me  6 hrs to figure out ( i missed a day of studying for the mcat)</p>
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